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Abstract So far no known measure of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence
has satisfied a minimal requirement concerning thresholds of acceptance. In contrast,
Shogenji’s new measure of justification (Shogenji, Synthese, this number 2009) does
the trick. As we show, it is ordinally equivalent to the most general measure which
satisfies this requirement. We further demonstrate that this general measure resolves
the problem of the irrelevant conjunction. Finally, we spell out some implications of
the general measure for the Conjunction Effect; in particular we give an example in
which the effect occurs in a larger domain, according to Shogenji justification, than
Carnap’s measure of confirmation would have led one to expect.
Keywords Probability · Confirmation · Justification
1 Introduction
Many functions have been proposed as measures of the confirmation that an evidential
proposition gives to a hypothetical proposition. They are functions of the conditional
probability that the hypothesis is true, given the evidence, as well as of the uncondi-
tional probabilities accorded to the hypothesis and to the evidence. The plethora of
confirmation measures is a serious impediment to progress, since the various functions
are not ordinally equivalent to one another. According to one measure, hypothesis h1
might be more highly confirmed by evidence e1 than h2 is confirmed by e2, whilst
another measure might reverse the ordering.
D. Atkinson (B)
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If a confirmation function is to serve as a measure of justification, it must have some
special properties. In order to say that a hypothesis is justified by some evidence, it is
not enough that a particular confirmation function produces a number that is positive:
the number must be greater than some threshold of acceptance. Moreover, not any
confirmation function is acceptable, for a minimal requirement is surely that, if two
or more independent hypotheses are each confirmed to a degree more (less) than the
threshold level of acceptance, then their conjunction must also be confirmed more
(less) than that same threshold level. Shogenji calls this criterion of acceptability the
General Conjunction Requirement (GCR), and he proposes a particular measure that
satisfies it Shogenji (2009).
In this paper I prove that, while Shogenji’s new measure is by no means the only
function that satisfies GCR, it is ordinally equivalent to any function that does so. We
may therefore say that Shogenji’s measure is, up to ordinal equivalence, the unique
measure that respects the requirement. If hypothesis h1 is more highly confirmed by
evidence e1 than h2 is confirmed by e2, according to one measure that satisfies GCR,
this remains true for any other measure that does so.
I consider also the problem of the irrelevant conjunction: while its Bayesian reso-
lution is not robust with respect to all the measures of confirmation on the market, it
is resolved by all measures of justification that respect GCR. I also give a new class of
examples of what may be called the Conjunction Effect, in which the degree of justifi-
cation of the conjunction of two hypotheses is greater than the degrees of confirmation
of either of the hypotheses separately.
2 Confirmation and justification
A measure of the confirmation of a hypothesis, h, by some evidence, e, may in general
be a function of the three double probabilities P(h ∧ e), P(h ∧ ¬e) and P(¬h ∧
e), which are independent, except that their sum cannot be greater than one. More
conveniently, one replaces these variables by P(h|e) = P(h ∧ e)/P(e), P(h) and
P(e),which are also independent. Such a measure is then some function F[P(h|e),
P(h), P(e)]. Following Shogenji, we shall first argue that the last argument should be
dropped in any measure of the justification of h by e. For if it were not so, one would
be able to change the value of F simply by appending some arbitrary, probabilistically
independent and irrelevant extra ‘evidence’ to e, say e′. The new measure would have
the form F[P(h|e ∧ e′), P(h), P(e ∧ e′)]. Since e′ is assumed to be irrelevant both to
the hypothesis and to the evidence, it is supposed that
P(e ∧ e′) = P(e)P(e′) P(h ∧ e ∧ e′) = P(h ∧ e)P(e′),
so P(h|e ∧ e′) = P(h|e). We require that the measure of justification be unaltered by
the adjunction of e′, so
F[P(h|e), P(h), P(e)] = F[P(h|e), P(h), P(e)P(e′)].
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Now since P(e′) could in principle be any number in [0, 1], F cannot depend nontri-
vially on the third argument. Such a measure of justification should in fact have the
following three properties:
(i) It should be a function of P(h|e) and P(h) only.
(ii) At constant P(h|e), it should be a decreasing function of P(h).
(iii) At constant P(h), it should be an increasing function of P(h|e).
We write, as the general form of a measure of justification,
J (h, e) = F[P(h|e), P(h)]. (1)
Many candidate measures of confirmation have been suggested in the course of the
years. A popular one, due to Carnap (1962), is
D(h, e) = P(h|e) − P(h).
Another one, invented by Keynes (1921), is






and it is clear that both of these satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii). Two other measures, favoured
by Kemeney and Oppenheim, and by Good, respectively, are
K (h, e) = P(e|h) − P(e|¬h)
P(e|h) + P(e|¬h)






They appear at first sight to have a different structure; but a little algebra serves to show
that they too can be expressed as functions of P(h|e) and P(h) only, and also that
requirements (ii) and (iii) are respected. On the other hand, the confirmation measures
C(h, e) = P(h ∧ e) − P(h)P(e)
S(h, e) = P(h|e) − P(h|¬e)
N (h, e) = P(e|h) − P(e|¬h)
depend nontrivially on P(e), as well as P(h|e) and P(h), and therefore cannot be
regarded as candidate measures of justification.
3 Justification and the conjunction requirements
What is the ‘correct’ justification function, F? Evidently conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) do
not determine it uniquely. Although the measures of confirmation C, S and N are ruled
out of court by (i), D, R, K and L survive as possibilities, and more can be conjured
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up. The worry is not merely that D, R, K and L are different measures, but rather that
they are ordinally inequivalent. To illustrate this, consider the set of examples
P(h|e) = 2−n P(h) = 2−m with m > n. (3)
Using subscripts to indicate the values of m and n, we find
D53 < D52 < D21
R21 < R53 < R52
K21 < K53 < K52
L21 < L53 < L52.
Evidently Keynes (R), Kemeny and Oppenheim (K ) and Good (L) agree about the
relative ordering of the degrees of confirmation that e accords to h in these examples,
but they disagree with Carnap (D). But should we have more confidence in Keynes’
ordering than in Carnap’s on the basis of a majority vote? Evidently we need some
other criterion to pick out a unique ordering.
According to Shogenji (2009), one should add to (i), (ii) and (iii) an additional
requirement of the following kind:
(iv) Suppose that h1 and h2 are two hypotheses, unconditionally independent and
also independent conditionally on evidence e. If both h1 and h2 have measures
of justification greater (less) than t , then the conjunction of these independent
hypotheses must also have a measure of justification greater (less) than t .
Symbolically, if
P(h1 ∧ h2) = P(h1)P(h2) and P(h1 ∧ h2|e) = P(h1|e)P(h2|e) ,
then it is required that
J (h1, e) < / > t and J (h2, e) < / > t entails J (h1 ∧ h2, e) < / > t.
Shogenji calls this the General Conjunction Requirement (GCR). Moreover, GCR is
required to hold, not merely for two independent hypotheses, but for any finite number
of them. It should be noted that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) require that a measure of
justification does not to depend on t , the choice made for the threshold of acceptance,
but only on the conditional and unconditional probabilities assigned to the hypothesis,
in light of the evidence.
All the popular measures of confirmation fail to meet the General Conjunction
Requirement [for a discussion of the nine measures of confirmation that we specified
in the previous section, see Atkinson et al. (2009)].
Condition (iv) implies
(iv′) If both h1 and h2 have measures of justification equal to t , the conjunction of
these independent hypotheses must also have a measure of justification equal
to t .
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This is so, because, as Shogenji shows, if J (h1, e) = J (h2, e) = a and J (h1∧h2, e) =
b, then if a were not equal to b one could choose t intermediate between a and b and
deduce that GCR would have to be violated at t , contrary to hypothesis. Symbolically,
J (h1, e) = t and J (h2, e) = t entails J (h1 ∧ h1, e) = t.
Shogenji calls this the Special Conjunction Requirement (SCR). Thus GCR entails
SCR.
In the Appendix we show that the most general measure of justification that satisfies
SCR, and the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), can be written in the form






where f [x] is a continuous, monotonically decreasing function of x . Moreover, we
show that such a measure satisfies GCR too, so it is in fact the most general form that
is allowed by the General Conjunction Requirement. It is also shown in the Appendix
that all such measures are ordinally equivalent to one another.
The simplest example is
J (h, e) = 1 − log P(h|e)
log P(h)
. (4)
The latter is identical to the function that Shogenji proposes, namely
J (h, e) = log2 P(h|e) − log2 P(h)− log2 P(h)
.
Note that the value of this expression does not change if one replaces the base 2 by
any other positive number. Another possibility is
J ′(h, e) = 2J (h,e) − 1 ,
Of course, J and J ′ are ordinally equivalent to one another, the first having the infinite
range (−∞, 1], the second having the finite range [−1, 1].
The measure J ′ can also be rewritten in the form
J ′(h, e) = 2 [P(h|e)]γ − 1 ,
where the exponent is defined by
γ = − 1
log2 P(h)
.
Note that γ is positive.
Although justification measures are far from unique—the general form involves
after all an arbitrary monotonic function—the ordering that they all induce is unique,
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and this is usually the important consideration. Returning to the examples (3), we find
the ordering
J53 < J21 < J52.
It is interesting that the Shogenji ordering of these examples differs from those given
by Carnap, by Keynes, by Good, or by Kemeny and Oppenheim.
4 Irrelevant conjunction
According to the hypothetico-deductive method, evidence e is deemed to confirm
hypothesis h relative to some background b when h∧b logically entails e, i.e. e∧h∧b =
h ∧ b. However, it follows ineluctably that, for any other hypothesis h′ whatsoever,
e ∧ h ∧ h′ ∧ b = h ∧ h′ ∧ b. This means that e also confirms the conjunction of h′
and h, relative to the same background b, even if h′ is independent of e, h and e ∧ h.
This is so counter-intuitive, nay so unacceptable, that this fact has seemed to many to
sound the death knell for the hypothetico-deductive method itself.
Bayesians distance themselves from this unpleasantness as follows. Hawthorne and
Fitelson (2004) have shown that, if h′ is irrelevant in the sense that the likelihood of e
is not affected by the conjunction of h′ with h and b, so P(e|h ∧h′ ∧b) = P(e|h ∧b),
then the Carnap confirmation that e accords to h, in the presence of b, is greater than
that accorded to the conjunction of h′ and h. This follows because the condition of
irrelevance means that
P(e ∧ h ∧ h′) = P(h ∧ h′)P(h ∧ e)/P(h),
where for brevity we have suppressed explicit mention of the background b. Consider
in this and subsequent formulae that the probability space has been reduced in such a
way that P(b) = 1. Then
D(h ∧ h′, e) = P(e ∧ h ∧ h
′)
P(e)
− P(h ∧ h′)
= P(h ∧ h
′)P(e ∧ h)
P(e)P(h)
− P(h ∧ h′)




It follows that, if h is Carnap-confirmed by e, then
0 ≤ D(h ∧ h′, e) ≤ D(h, e).
The conjunction of h and h′ is also Carnap-confirmed by e, but generally to a lesser
degree [unless P(h ∧ h′) = P(h), which is so only if h logically entails h′ (in the
presence of b)].
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This result is satisfactory, for an irrelevant h′ that has little overlap with h will
produce a conjunction that is Carnap-confirmed only to a slight extent. But there is a
snake in the grass. This result does not hold for all measures of confirmation. It does
work with Good’s measure L , and with Kemeny and Oppenheim’s measure K , but
not with Keynes’ measure R. In fact
R(h ∧ h′, e) = log P(e ∧ h ∧ h
′)
P(e)P(h ∧ h′)
= log P(e ∧ h)
P(e)P(h)
= R(h, e).
So with Keynes’ measure the irrelevant conjunction problem is back in full force:
the conjunction of a hypothesis with an irrelevant hypothesis (remember, always rel-
ative to some background) is Keynes-confirmed to precisely the same degree as is the
original hypothesis alone.
So Hawthorne and Fitelson’s result is not robust, in the sense that it fails for one
commonly used measure of confirmation (as these authors realized full well). But
Shogenji has now shown us that a solution is at hand! We should not be using mea-
sures of confirmation, but rather measures of justification. In fact the measure (4) of
justification can be written




J (h, e) = − R(h ∧ h
′, e)
log P(h)
= log P(h ∧ h
′)
log P(h)
J (h ∧ h′, e) ≥ J (h ∧ h′, e).1
Because all measures of justification are ordinally equivalent, this resolution of the
irrelevant conjunction problem applies to them all.
5 Conjunction effects
In this section we shall be looking for situations in which two hypotheses h1 and h2
are both confirmed by some evidence e, and in which the conjunction h1 ∧ h2 is even
more highly confirmed. From the Venn diagram of Fig. 1 we read off
1 Since log P(h ∧ h′) ≤ log P(h) and log P(h) is negative, it follows that log P(h ∧ h′)/log P(h) ≥ 1.
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P (h1 ∧ h2 ∧ e) = x
P (h1 ∧ h2) = x+ z0
P (h1 ∧ e) = x+ z2
P (h2 ∧ e) = x+ z1
P (h1) = x+ y1 + z0 + z2
P (h2) = x+ y2 + z0 + z1
P (e) = x+ y0 + z1 + z2
Fig. 1 Venn diagram for hypotheses and evidence
We consider first the Carnap measure of confirmation,
D(h, e) = P(h|e) − P(h),
before returning to Shogenji’s measure of justification. The strategy will be to reduce
the effective number of dimensions from seven to two. Consider the case in which six
of the triple probabilities are equal, x = y0 = y1 = y2 = z1 = z2, but where the
seventh, z0, has in general a different value. The global constraint is that the sum of
all seven triples cannot exceed unity. We find
D(h1, e) = 12 − 3x − z0
D(h1 ∧ h2, e) = 14 − x − z0
D(h1, e) − D(h1 ∧ h2, e) = 14 − 2x .
The following domains can thus be distinguished:
global constraint −→ 6x + z0 ≤ 1
D(h1, e) > 0 ←→ 3x + z0 < 12
D(h1 ∧ h2, e) > 0 ←→ x + z0 < 14
D(h1, e) > D(h1 ∧ h2, e) ←→ x < 18 (5)
What happens if we use Shogenji’s new measure of justification instead of Carnap’s
measure of confirmation? The first three inequalities of (5) are unaffected. This is
clear, for D(h1, e) > 0 is equivalent to P(h1|e) > P(h1), and that is equivalent to
J (h1, e) > 0, and similarly D(h1 ∧ h2, e) > 0 is equivalent to J (h1 ∧ h2, e) > 0.
The matter is different for the last inequality of (5). When are the hypotheses h1 or
h2 less justified by e than their conjunction is justified by e? From the definition (4)
we calculate
J (h1, e) − J (h1 ∧ h2, e) = log(x + z0) − 2 log(3x + z0)log(x + z0) log(3x + z0) .
So there is a conjunction effect, namely J (h1, e) < J (h1 ∧ h2, e) and J (h2, e) <
J (h1 ∧ h2, e), whenever (3x + z0)2 > (x + z0).
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Fig. 2 Allowed region in x − z0 plane. Dashed lines are outside the allowed region
Figure 2 displays various regions of the x–z0 plane. In the triangular region bounded
by the horizontal x-axis, the vertical line at x = 18 , and the sloping line of the global
constaint, h1 ∧ h2 is more highly Carnap-confirmed by e than are h1 or h2 separately;
but in fact the domain in which this conjunction has a higher measure of Shogenji
justification is slightly larger, namely to the right of the parabola indicated by the








the measure J (h1 ∧ h2, e)
is positive, but only the part of this line that is to the left of the global line from (0, 1) to( 1
6 , 0
)








the measure J (h1, e) is positive.
Thus the region in which a conjunction effect occurs is bounded by the parabola on
its left and the global constraint line on its right.
The black triangle within the above triangular region indicates where there is a
conjunction effect (according to both D and J ), and where moreover h1 and h2 are
disconfirmed by e, while h1 ∧ h2 is confirmed. The conjunction is not merely con-
firmed, but is in fact justified by e, while the conjuncts are each unjustified. This
yields a new example of what was called the Alan Author effect in Atkinson et al.
(2009).
In the paper just cited, it was proved that the conjunction effect occurs whenever
z1 = 0 = z2, irrespective of the values of the remaining five triple probabilities. This
was demonstrated in that paper to be true for ten different interpretations of what con-
firmation means. The result was on that account called robust. With the new measure
of justification, we may ask whether J (h1 ∧h2, e) > J (h1, e) whenever z1 = 0 = z2.
We find











log(x + z0) log(x + y1 + z0) ,
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and this is strictly positive if none of the remaining five triples vanish, since the two
factors in the numerator are positive, while the two factors in the denominator are neg-
ative. Similarly J (h1 ∧ h2, e) > J (h2, e). Thus z1 = 0 = z2 is a sufficient condition
for a justificatory conjunction effect.
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Appendix
J (h, e) is a function of x = P(h|e) and y = P(h) only,
J (h, e) = F(x, y), (6)
where F(x, y) is a continuous function for x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ (0, 1). Discontinuities
or divergences are allowed if P(h) is extremal (0 or 1), but continuity with respect to
the conditional probability, P(h|e), is required at both end points.
Let h1, h2 and e be propositions such that
P(h1|e) = P(h2|e) = x
P(h1) = P(h2) = y
and let h1 and h2 be independent of one another, conditionally with respect to e, and
also unconditionally:
P(h1 ∧ h2|e) = P(h1|e)P(h2|e) = x2
P(h1 ∧ h2) = P(h1)P(h2) = y2.
If t is the threshold of acceptance, SCR requires that, if J (h1, e) = t and J (h2, e) = t ,
then J (h1 ∧ h2, e) = t . Thus J (h1 ∧ h2, e) = J (h1, e), and so, from Eq. 6,
F(x, y) = F(x2, y2). (7)
Change the variables and the function from F(x, y) to G(x, u), where
u = log x
log y
G(x, u) = F(x, y).
Condition (7) becomes
G(x, u) = G(x2, u).
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For any x ∈ (0, 1), we can iterate this equation to obtain
G(x, u) = G(x2, u) = G(x4, u) = . . . = G(x2n , u).
Since the function G(x, u) is required to be continuous at x = 0, we can take the
limit n → ∞ and conclude that G(x, u) = G(0, u) ≡ f [u] is an arbitrary continuous
function of u. Hence






J (h, e) is an increasing function of P(h|e) and a decreasing function of P(h), so it
follows that f [u] must be a decreasing function of u (since log P(h|e) and log P(h)
are both negative). The most general function of justification that satisfies SCR has the
form (8), subject to the constraint that f [u] is a continuous, monotonically decreasing
function of u.
We shall show that the general form (8) respects GCR as well as SCR. Let h1 and h2
be independent of one another, conditionally with respect to e, and also uncondition-
ally. Suppose that a realization, J , of Eq. 8 is such that J (h1, e) > t and J (h2, e) > t ,
where t is some threshold of acceptance. So
log P(h1|e)
log P(h1)
< f −1(t) and log P(h2|e)
log P(h2)
< f −1(t) ,
where the inverse function, f −1, is guaranteed to exist, given the monotonicity of f .
Then
log[P(h1 ∧ h2|e)] = log[P(h1|e)P(h2|e)]
= log P(h1|e) + log P(h2|e)
> f −1(t)[log P(h1) + log P(h2)]
= f −1(t) log[P(h1)P(h2)]
= f −1(t) log[P(h1 ∧ h2)].
Therefore
log P(h1 ∧ h2|e)
log P(h1 ∧ h2) < f
−1(t) ,
and so J (h1 ∧ h2, e) > t . A similar proof works with the inequalities working in
the opposite direction, i.e. if J (h1, e) < t and J (h2, e) < t then J (h1 ∧ h2, e) < t .
Moreover, the method extends straightforwardly to an arbitrary finite number of inde-
pendent hypotheses h1, h2, . . . , hn, instead of two. This concludes the demonstration
that Eq. 8 encapsulates the most general measure of justification.
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All measures that satisfy the above conditions are ordinally equivalent to one
another. For consider two different measures:











Because f1 is a monotonically decreasing function, a necessary and sufficient condi-







and because of the monotonicity of f2, this is a necessary and sufficient condition that
J2(h1, e1) > J2(h2, e2). Analogous reasoning holds if the sign > is replaced by < or
by =. Thus all measures of justification are ordinally equivalent to one another.
If h and e are such that P(h|e) = P(h), then J (h, e) = f [1], irrespective of the
value of P(h) ∈ (0, 1). Shogenji calls this the condition of equineutrality, and we
conventionally set f [1] = 0. If, on the other hand, h and e are such that P(h|e) = 1,
then J (h, e) = f [0], irrespective of the value of P(h) ∈ (0, 1). Shogenji calls this
the condition of equimaximality, and we conventionally set f [0] = 1.
The simplest realization of the above constraints is f [u] = 1 − u, which leads to
J (h, e) = 1 − log P(h|e)
log P(h)
= log P(h|e) − log P(h)− log P(h) . (9)
It is easy to see that this realization is a continuous function of P(h|e) [for fixed
P(h) ∈ (0, 1)], when P(h|e) ∈ (0, 1], but not at P(h|e) = 0, for at this point J (h, e)
diverges to minus infinity. So J (h, e) is not acceptable if we insist on continuity at
P(h|e) = 0. A realization that achieves continuity at both ends is
f [u] = 21−u − 1 ,
which gives the measure
J ′(h, e) = 2J (h,e) − 1 , (10)
and this takes on the value −1 when P(h|e) = 0, the value 0 when P(h|e) = P(h),
and 1 when P(h|e) = 1.
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